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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a Parisian woman who collects handbags designed by 
Longchamp. If and when this woman travels to the United States, she 
will likely expect any product emblazoned with the Longchamp horse 
logo to originate from a similar source as the handbags she has 
previously purchased in France. However, the present structure of U.S. 
trademark law under the Lanham Act does not assure our consumer that 
the Longchamp horse logo found on a product in the United States will 
be of the same quality as the products from Longchamp with which she 
was familiar in France. 
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Currently, there is no explicit protection in the Lanham Act for 
marks that are famous, yet not actually used, in the United States.1 Thus, 
there is no guarantee for a consumer visiting the United States from 
abroad that a product bearing the same trademark as one back home 
originates from the same source and is therefore of similar quality as the 
product to which the foreign consumer is accustomed. 
For over 60 years, the Lanham Act2 has governed trademark 
protection in the United States. Congress promulgated the Lanham Act to 
encourage fair competition, efficiently allocate resources, and provide 
incentives for trademark-holders to improve product quality.3 
Historically, U.S. law has provided protection to only those trademarks 
actually used in the United States.4 However, as a result of increased 
outsourcing and globalization of trade, trademarks from even the most 
remote areas of the globe regularly surface in the consciousness of U.S. 
consumers.5 U.S. courts have struggled to deal with the rise of 
trademarks that are famous and recognized by domestic consumers, yet 
fail to meet the “use in commerce” element required to provide 
protection under the Lanham Act.6 One approach, adopted by the Ninth 
Circuit, grants priority in limited circumstances to trademarks that are 
famous and recognized by consumers in a particular market but are not 
“actually used” in that market under the requirements set forth in the 
Lanham Act.7 In contrast, the Second Circuit has hesitated to grant 
protection to trademarks that do not meet the “actual use” standard.8 The 
                                                                                                             
 1 The Lanham Act requires “use[] in commerce” to establish a claim for civil 
liability.  15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2006). 
 2 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 et seq. (2006). The Lanham Act is the popular name for the 
Trademark Act of 1946. 
 3 Elizabeth M. Flanagan, No Free Parking: Obtaining Relief from Trademark–
Infringing Domain Name Parking, 92 MINN. L. REV. 498, 509 (2007). See 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1127 (2006) (The intent of this Act is to . . . protect persons engaged in such commerce 
against unfair competition; to prevent fraud and deception in such commerce . . . and to 
provide rights and remedies stipulated by treaties and conventions respecting trademarks, 
trade names, and unfair competition entered into between the United States and foreign 
nations). See also 1 J. Thomas McCarthy, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION, §§ 2:1–5 (4th ed. 2007) [hereinafter “MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS”]. 
 4 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1). 
 5 Frederick W. Mostert, Famous and Well-Known Marks: an International Analysis 
1–2 (Butterworths 1997). 
 6 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(a)(1), 1127. The power of Congress to enact the Lanham Act is 
derived from the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. U.S. Const. art. I, 8, cl. 3.; 
Bonder, Moshe H., Patent and Lanham Acts: Serving Two Legitimate Purposes or 
Providing an Indefinite Monopoly?, 15 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 11 (2004). Under the 
Lanham Act, “use in commerce” means “the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary 
course of trade.”  15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
 7 See Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 8 See ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2007). 
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Second Circuit strictly applies the territoriality principle, which provides 
that trademarks registered in a foreign country have no priority of right 
over trademarks used domestically, regardless of the degree to which 
domestic consumers recognize the trademark (i.e. the degree of fame 
inherent in the trademark).9 
The scope of what constitutes a famous mark, defined in the 
Lanham Act as a mark that is “widely recognized by the general 
consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of the 
goods or services of the mark’s owner,”10 has not been clearly interpreted 
by the federal circuit courts of appeals.11 Part I of this Comment will 
discuss the difficulties encountered in defining a famous foreign mark. 
Part I will also discuss the overarching principles of territoriality12 and 
universality13 used to determine the type of “use” sufficient to warrant 
trademark protection. International law has addressed the famous marks 
issue in Article 6bis of the Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property (the “Paris Convention”).14 Article 6bis provides an 
exception to the territoriality principle by allowing protection of a 
famous or well-known trademark even when such trademark has not 
been “use[d] in commerce”15 in the country in question.16 This Comment 
urges Congress to incorporate Article 6bis into the Lanham Act because 
protecting well-known and famous marks of other countries brought into 
the United States will encourage foreign producers to enter the U.S. 
                                                                                                             
 9 See generally id. 
 10 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A). 
 11 It should be noted that most jurisdictions draw a distinction between “famous” and 
“well-known” marks. Typically, the former type of mark warrants a higher degree of 
reputation and protection. See MOSTERT, supra note 5, at 21. For purposes of this 
Comment, the terms “famous” and “well-known” will be used interchangeably because 
the myriad of definitions attributed to these terms in the literature do not permit a clear 
definition for either term. See also INT’L TRADEMARKS ASS’N, FAMOUS AND WELL-
KNOWN MARKS (April 3, 1995), http://www.inta.org/index.php?option=com_content& 
task=view&id=1721&Itemid=59&getcontent=1 (last visited December 29, 2008). 
 12 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “territoriality” as “[t]he principle that a nation has 
the right of sovereignty within its borders.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1512 (8th ed. 
2004). 
 13 Universality is also referred to as “national treatment,” or the “policy or practice of 
a country that accords the citizens of other countries the same intellectual-property 
protection as it gives its own citizens, with no formal treaty of reciprocity required.”  This 
principle formed the foundation for the first international intellectual-property treaties of 
the nineteenth century, including the Paris Convention. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1054 
(8th ed. 2004). 
 14 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 6bis, March 20, 
1883, last revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 53 Stat. 1748, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 
[hereinafter Paris Convention]. 
 15 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1). 
 16 Paris Convention, supra note 14. 
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market for the sale of their goods. Such protection will expand consumer 
choice and, ultimately, reduce consumer search costs.17 
Part II will address the theory of consumer search costs as an 
overall justification for trademark law and the effects of increased 
consumer search costs on economic efficiency. Reduction of consumer 
search costs has long been considered a principal aim of trademark law.18 
This central goal must remain at the heart of any and all policy-making 
as the law of trademarks continues to evolve.19 
Part III will outline the current circuit split on the Famous Foreign 
Marks Doctrine.20 In ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., the Second Circuit 
firmly rejected the application of any exception to the territoriality 
principle for famous marks.21 The Second Circuit found that Congress 
had intentionally excluded protection for famous but unused marks from 
the scope of the Lanham Act and that, absent any further explanation 
from Congress on the issue, the Second Circuit would continue to 
disregard the theory of a Famous Foreign Marks Doctrine.22 In contrast, 
and in contravention of the territoriality principle, the Ninth Circuit, in 
Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co., permitted protection of 
famous foreign marks on policy grounds.23 The Ninth Circuit found that 
the territoriality principle should not be absolute and that, when equity 
demanded, exceptions to the territoriality rule should be made for marks 
that are famous and well-known within the relevant market in question.24 
                                                                                                             
 17 General economic theory divides the total cost of a good into two components: (1) 
price of the good or service (“price”) and (2) costs incurred by the consumer to gather 
information about the good or service and its vendor, including the transaction costs of 
inspection and negotiation (“search costs”). Michael Grynberg, The Road Not Taken: 
Initial Interest Confusion, Search Costs, and the Challenge of the Internet, 28 SEATTLE L. 
R. 97, 109 (2004). William Landes and Richard Posner engineered a model representing 
the dual costs incurred in any purchase of a good or service. This model defined the full 
price of a good (π) as the sum of the money price of the good (P) and the search costs 
incurred by a consumer in obtaining information about the relevant attributes of the good 
(H). The strength of a trademark reduces the value of the search cost component (H); 
therefore, a product with a strong trademark has lower search costs (H) than a product 
with a weak trademark (or none at all). William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, 
Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 266 (1987). For further 
discussion of search costs, see infra Part II. 
 18 Landes & Posner, supra note 17. 
 19 Stephen L. Carter, The Trouble with Trademark, 99 YALE L.J. 759, 762 (1990). 
 20 The “Famous Foreign Marks Doctrine” provides an exception to the principle of 
territoriality for famous and well-known marks that protects a mark that is well-known, 
but has not been actually used, in the U.S. market. Vaudable v. Monmartre, Inc., 193 
N.Y.S.2d 332 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959). 
 21 ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 163–65 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 22 Id. 
 23 Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 24 Id. at 1094. 
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Part IV will discuss the positive effects that adoption of a 
territoriality exception for famous marks in the United States would have 
on consumer search costs and overall economic efficiency. Protecting 
famous foreign marks will allow a consumer to confidently rely on 
purchases of goods she made previously, regardless of whether such 
prior purchases occurred in the United States or in a foreign country. 
This Comment proposes that because of the importance of reducing 
a consumer’s search costs, maintaining economic efficiency, and 
preserving the goals of trademark law, Congress should amend the 
Lanham Act to expressly recognize the Famous Foreign Marks Doctrine. 
This recognition may be accomplished by incorporating, by reference, 
Article 6bis of the Paris Convention25 into the Lanham Act. Due to the 
rise in trafficking of goods through Internet marketing and sales, as well 
as the increase in international travel for both business and personal 
purposes, there is currently a greater need for Congress to address this 
issue than ever before. 
PART I: DEFINING FAMOUS FOREIGN MARKS 
This Part will discuss the principles of territoriality and universality 
as justifications for trademark law, and will address the small (but 
growing) body of scholars and judges who seek to apply an exception to 
territoriality in connection with a famous foreign mark in the United 
States—thus favoring the concept of universality in a limited context. 
The Paris Convention, in Article 6bis, expressly provides an exception to 
territoriality for famous marks, known as the Famous Foreign Marks 
Doctrine.26 The application of, and rationale behind, Article 6bis will 
also be addressed, as well as its force in the United States following the 
recent Supreme Court case of Medellin v. Texas.27 
What constitutes a “famous mark?” According to the text of the 
Lanham Act, a trademark is “famous” when “it is widely recognized by 
the general consuming public of the United States as a designation of 
source of the goods or services of the mark’s owner.”28 For example, a 
                                                                                                             
 25 See Paris Convention, supra note 14. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Medellin v. Texas, 129 S. Ct. 360 (2008). 
 28 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (2006). A court may consider all relevant factors to 
determine whether a mark possesses the requisite degree of recognition, including but not 
limited to “(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark; (B) the 
duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods or services with 
which the mark is used; (C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the 
mark; (D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used; (E) the 
channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark is used; (F) the degree of 
recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of trade used by the marks’ 
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consumer who sees an establishment featuring the McDonald’s Arches29 
will immediately associate the establishment with hamburgers, 
milkshakes, and other recognizable McDonald’s fare. The McDonald’s 
trademark is indisputably “famous” under federal law.30 
Consumer belief that every product bearing the same symbol 
originates from the same source indicates that the symbol has the 
“source-identifying property of a trademark.”31 Source-identifying 
properties need not be “fanciful,” “arbitrary,” or “suggestive” words or 
designs.32 A distinctive color may sufficiently identify the origin of the 
good such that the color receives protection as a trademark.33 It is a 
mark’s “source-distinguishing ability,” and “not its ontological status as 
color, shape, fragrance, word, or sign,”34 that enables a mark to serve the 
goal of “reduc[ing] the consumer’s costs of shopping and making 
purchasing decisions.”35 
But the McDonald’s Arches are widely known and used both inside 
and outside the United States.36 McDonald’s operates over 31,000 
restaurants bearing the Arches in more than 100 countries.37 What of 
those trademarks that are well-known in the United States, but are not 
used in the American market? Many courts have held that prior use of a 
mark in the United States is a precondition to maintain a cause of action 
                                                                                                             
owner and the person against whom the injunction is sought; (G) the nature and extent of 
use of the same or similar marks by third parties; and (H) whether the mark was 
registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the 
principal register.” Id. 
 29 The “McDonald’s Arches” are a trademark of McDonald’s Corporation. 
 30 See Alexis Weissberger, Note, Is Fame Alone Sufficient To Create Priority Rights: 
An International Perspective On The Viability Of The Famous/Well-Known Marks 
Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 739, 747 n.39 (2006). 
 31 Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV. 2099, 
2105 (2004). 
 32 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 166 (1995) (quoting 
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1975)). 
 33 Id. (finding that holder’s use of a green-gold color on its press pads met the basic 
requirements for trademark protection). 
 34 Id. at 164. 
 35 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 3, at § 2:03. 
 36 See Weissberger, supra note 30, at 775 (discussing use of McDonald’s trademark 
in South Africa); Michael Wallace Gordon, Hamburgers Abroad: Cultural Variations 
Affecting Franchising Abroad, 9 CONN. J. INT’L L. 165, 172 (1994) (identifying the 
McDonald’s golden arches as a symbol of U.S. culture). See also McDonald’s Corp. v. 
McBagel’s, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 1268 (S.D.N.Y. December 10, 1986) (describing evidence 
of McDonald’s news media use and extensive advertising program relating to the “Mc” 
prefix mark). 
 37 As of 2006, McDonald’s operated 31,046 restaurants in 118 countries. See 
MCDONALD’S CORPORATION, 2006 Annual Report 22 (2007). 
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for trademark infringement and dilution.38 Indeed, U.S. law establishes 
trademark rights according to priority of use, not registration.39 The party 
who first uses the mark generally has “priority of ownership over 
conflicting claimants.”40 
Two contrasting principles have developed to address the issue of 
trademarks registered in one country that enter another country: (1) the 
territoriality principle and (2) the universality principle.41 Historically, 
the territoriality principle has governed trademark protection.42 Under 
this principle, trademarks that are registered in a foreign country and 
enter the home country have no priority of right over trademarks used in 
the home country, even if consumers in the home country are familiar 
with the foreign mark.43 A trademark is considered to have a separate 
legal existence under the respective laws of each country in which it is 
registered,44 and ownership of a mark in one country will not 
automatically confer the exclusive right to use the mark in another 
country.45 In a territoriality regime, a foreign-registered trademark will 
infringe upon a domestic-registered trademark regardless of the impact 
of the foreign-registered trademark in the domestic country.46 
In contrast to the territoriality principle, the universality principle 
focuses on the ability of the trademark to properly identify the source of 
the goods to which it is affixed.47 Under the universality principle, 
                                                                                                             
 38 See Almacenes Exito S.A. v. El Gallo Meat Mkt., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 324, 326 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005). See also United States v. Steffens (Trade-Mark Cases), 100 U.S. 82 
(1879); Hanover Star Milling v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916); United Drug Co. v. 
Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918); Person’s Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565, 
1568 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Buti v. Impressa Perosa, S.R.L., 139 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 39 Jeffrey M. Samuels and Linda M. Samuels, A Review of Recent Decisions of The 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Article: The Trademark Jurisprudence of 
Judge Rich, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 761, 764 n.9 (2007). See also Almacenes Exito S.A. v. El 
Gallo Meat Mkt., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 324, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); In re Trade-Mark 
Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879). 
 40 Henry W. Leeds and Norm D. St. Landau, A Review of Recent Decisions of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Area Summary: Review of the 1986 
Trademark Decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 
903, 913 (1987). 
 41 See Margo A. Bagley, Using Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 to Block 
Materially Different Gray Market Goods in the Common Control Context: Are Reports of 
its Death Greatly Exaggerated?, 44 EMORY L.J. 1541, 1545–1546 (1995). 
 42 Person’s Co., 900 F.2d at 1569–70. 
 43 ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 155 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 44 Stephen M. Auvil, Gray Market Goods Produced by Foreign Affiliates of the U.S. 
Trademark Owner: Should the Lanham Act Provide a Remedy?, 28 AKRON L. REV. 437, 
440 (1995). 
 45 ITC Ltd., 482 F.3d at 155. 
 46 Michael B. Weicher, Note, K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.: A Black Decision for the 
Gray Market, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 463, 479–80 (1989). 
 47 Bagley, supra note 41, at 1546. 
220 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 5:213 
merchandise trademarked in one country may be transported to another 
country lawfully, without the threat of infringement, so long as the 
trademark accurately identifies the source of the merchandise.48 This will 
be the result even if someone other than the owner of the merchandise 
has an exclusive right to the trademark in the second destination 
country.49 Unfortunately for proponents of universality, however, this 
principle has been met with resistance in the United States.50 The 
Supreme Court rejected the universality principle in 1923,51 a position 
supported by concurrently enacted statutes.52 
While the territoriality principle is one of the basic fundamentals of 
U.S. trademark law,53 not all theorists consider the principle absolute.54 
In 1959, in Vaudable v. Montmartre, New York created an exception to 
the territoriality principle, reasoning that famous foreign marks deserve 
protection in the United States even if they have never been used here.55 
In Vaudable, restaurant proprietors in New York opened a restaurant 
named “Maxim’s.” 56 A well-known, upscale restaurant by the same 
name was established in Paris, France in 1893, and continues to operate 
to this day.57 The owners of the Paris Maxim’s sought to enjoin operation 
                                                                                                             
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. See also Maureen Beyers, The Greying of American Trademarks: The Genuine 
Goods Exclusion Act and the Incongruity of Customs Regulation 19 C.F.R. § 133.21, 54 
FORDHAM L. REV. 83, 107 (1985). 
 50 See ITC Ltd., 482 F.3d at 155 n.14. See also Am. Circuit Breaker Corp. v. Oregon 
Breakers, Inc., 406 F.3d 577, 581 (9th Cir. 2005); Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. 
Supp. 1163, 1171 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Beyers, supra note 49, at 155 n.144 (asserting that 
universality has been replaced with the principle of territoriality). 
 51 See A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689, 692 (1923); Philip Morris, Inc. v. 
Allen Distribs., Inc., 48 F. Supp. 2d 844, 850 (S.D. Ind. 1999) (discussing impact of the 
Katzel decision on trademark law). 
 52 See 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (2006). The Tariff Act of 1930 states: “Except as 
provided in subsection (d) . . . it shall be unlawful to import into the United States any 
merchandise of foreign manufacture if such merchandise . . . bears a trade-mark owned 
by a citizen of . . . the United States, and registered in the Patent Office . . . under the 
provisions of the Act . . . unless written consent of the owner of such trade-mark is 
produced at the time of making entry.”  This provision gave a U.S. registered trademark-
owner the right to exclude foreign goods bearing the same trademark as those registered 
by the U.S. company. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 
1985). 
 53 Person’s Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 54 See Andrew Terry and Heather Forrest, Where’s the Beef? Why Burger King is 
Hungry Jack’s in Australia and Other Complications in Building a Global Franchise 
Brand, 28 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 171, 173 (2008). 
 55 Vaudable v. Montmartre, Inc., 193 N.Y.S.2d 332, 335 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959). See 
also Dan L. Burk, Trademark Doctrines for Global Electronic Commerce, 49 S.C. L. 
REV. 695, 720 (1998). 
 56 Vaudable, 193 N.Y.S.2d at 334. 
 57 Id. at 758. 
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of the Manhattan restaurant.58 The court found that the Paris Maxim’s 
mark was sufficiently famous to warrant protection in the United States59 
and enjoined operation of the New York Maxim’s, despite the fact that 
the owners of the Paris Maxim’s had never operated a restaurant in New 
York.60 Pursuant to the exception to territoriality created in Vaudable, a 
famous foreign trademark will be protected in the United States if the 
mark is well-known here, even though the mark has not been “actually 
used” or registered in the United States.61 This exception to the 
territoriality principle is what is commonly referred to as the “Famous 
Foreign Marks Doctrine.”62 
Proponents of the Famous Foreign Marks Doctrine rely on the Paris 
Convention to support adoption of this doctrine into U.S. trademark 
law.63 The drafters of the Paris Convention understood 125 years ago that 
there existed some trademarks whose fame transcended the territoriality 
principle. The Paris Convention, which was put in force in the United 
States on May 30, 1887,64 seventy-two years before Vaudable, is perhaps 
the clearest authority for establishing standards for infringement of a 
well-known mark.65 Article 6bis of the Paris Convention, which serves as 
a basis for universal recognition of well-known marks, provides that: 
[t]he countries of the Union undertake . . . to prohibit the use[] of 
a trademark which constitutes a reproduction, an imitation, or a 
translation, liable to create confusion, of a mark considered by 
the competent authority of the country of registration or use to be 
                                                                                                             
 58 Id. See also Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (discussing the fame and notoriety of the Paris Maxim’s). 
 59 According to the court, regarding the Paris Maxim’s, “[t]here [was] no doubt as to 
its unique and eminent position as a restaurant of international fame and prestige.”  
Vaudable, 193 N.Y.S.2d at 334. 
 60 Vaudable, 193 N.Y.S.2d at 335–36. 
 61 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 3, at § 29:61. 
 62 The standard set forth by the Supreme Court of New York in Vaudable, adopting a 
famous marks exception to the territoriality principle, has never been specifically adopted 
by either the New York Court of Appeals nor any intermediate New York appellate court. 
This failure to recognize the Famous Foreign Marks Doctrine as a legitimate common 
law doctrine led the Second Circuit to explicitly decline to adopt the Famous Foreign 
Marks Doctrine in a recent decision in ITC v. Punchgini. ITC v. Punchgini, 482 F.3d 135, 
165 (2d Cir. 2007); see also infra Part III. 
 63 Paris Convention, supra note 14. The benefits of the Paris Convention are enjoyed 
by each member country of the Union for the Protection of Industrial Property. Id. at art. 
1–2. The Union for the Protection of Industrial Property consists of the countries to 
which the Paris Convention applies. Id. 
 64 World Intellectual Property Organization, Treaties Database – Contracting Parties, 
Paris Convention, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/Remarks.jsp?cnty_id=334C (last 
visited December 29, 2008). 
 65 MOSTERT, supra note 5, at 6. 
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well known in that country as being already the mark of a person 
entitled to the benefits of this Convention.66 
Article 6bis requires that, where a person in one member country holds a 
trademark that is “well-known” in another member country, the domestic 
trademark-holder must not face competition in the foreign country’s 
market from any product that would likely create confusion with its own 
product, trademarked domestically but not in the foreign market. 
In McDonalds Corp. v. Joburgers Drive-Inn Restaurant Ltd., a fast-
food restaurant proprietor—Joburgers—sought to use the familiar golden 
arches design and BIG MAC trademarks, as well as the McDonald’s 
name, in a new chain of restaurants.67 At that time, McDonald’s had 
registered several trademarks in South Africa, but had not used them.68 
Despite the absence of use of any of the McDonald’s marks in South 
Africa, the court found that the McDonald’s name and its principal 
trademark, the golden arches, were well-known among the “portion of 
persons who would be interested in the goods or services provided by 
McDonald’s.”69 The court examined Joburgers’ use of the McDonald’s 
trademark within the meaning of South Africa’s Trade Marks Act,70 
enacted only one year prior to the commencement of the Joburgers 
litigation, which gave legislative effect to the provisions of Article 6bis 
of the Paris Convention.71 The court held that because the McDonald’s 
trademarks were well-known, use of these marks by Joburgers would 
cause deception or confusion among South Africans.72 Therefore, the 
court forbade Joburgers’ use of the McDonald’s trademark in South 
Africa.73 
Aside from conflict-of-law issues,74 conflicts arise surrounding the 
definition of the term “well-known.”75 The Paris Convention “does not 
define the conditions under which a trademark is to be considered well 
known” and, therefore, considerable uncertainty exists regarding the 
circumstances under which the holder of a trademark may invoke the 
                                                                                                             
 66 See Paris Convention, supra note 14 (emphasis added). 
 67 McDonalds Corp. v. Joburgers Drive-Inn Restaurant (Pty) Ltd. 1996 (1) SA 1(A) 
(S. Afr.). 
 68 Id. at 2. 
 69 Id. at 65. 
 70 Trade Marks Act No. 194 of 1993. 
 71 McDonald’s, supra note 67, at 21; Trade Marks Act No. 194 of 1993 s. 35 
 72 Id. at 66. 
 73 Id. at 75. 
 74 See, e.g., In re Rath, 402 F.3d 1207, 1215 (Fed Cir. 2005); Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. 
Canadian Pac. Ry., Ltd., 357 F.3d 1319, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 75 MOSTERT, supra note 5, at 16 (advocating a “case-by-case approach” to determine 
whether a mark is famous or well-known). 
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protection of Article 6bis.76 The 1994 Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) does provide some 
insight on the meaning of the term “well-known mark.” 77 TRIPS 
provides that in making the determination whether a trademark is well-
known, account shall be taken “of the knowledge of the trademark in the 
relevant sector of the public, including knowledge in the Member 
concerned which has been obtained as a result of the promotion of the 
trademark.”78 
Article 6bis was designed to govern the “reputation without use” 
scenario, in which a trademark pirate registers a trademark in one 
country, therefore pre-empting a foreign holder of that well-known 
trademark from using the mark in the country where the pirate has 
registered his trademark.79 Actual use by the pirate is not required by the 
Paris Convention; mere registration of the well-known trademark will 
suffice to invoke the protections of Article 6bis against the pirate.80 This 
approach stands in stark contrast to the U.S. rule, which requires actual 
use in commerce to maintain a cause of action for infringement or 
dilution under the Lanham Act.81 
At least one country has encountered the issue of the use of a 
famous, yet unregistered, trademark.82 In 2005, the well-known 
STARBUCKS trademark had not yet been registered in Russia.83 A 
Russian entrepreneur registered the STARBUCKS trademark and logo, 
and immediately offered to sell use rights to the U.S. owner of the 
STARBUCKS trademark for $600,000.84 While the U.S. trademark 
owner prevailed in legal action against the Russian entrepreneur on 
                                                                                                             
 76 Id. at 17 (citing Memorandum prepared by the International Bureau (WIPO), 
“Protection of Well-Known Marks: Results of the Study by The International Bureau and 
Prospects for Improvement of the Existing Situation,” Committee of Experts on Well-
Known Marks, Meeting in Geneva, November 13–16, 1995, at 6). 
 77 The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 
Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994). 
 78 Id. 
 79 Mark D. Nielsen, Cohiba: Not Just Another Name, Not Just Another Stogie: Does 
General Cigar Own a Valid Trademark for the Name “Cohiba” in the United States?,  21 
LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 633, 645 (1999). See also MOSTERT, supra note 5, at 19 
(describing “reputation-without-use” as the scenario in which a mark was neither 
registered nor used but had acquired a well-known reputation in the local jurisdiction). 
 80 Nielsen, supra note 79, at 645. 
 81 See Almacenes Exito S.A. v. El Gallo Meat Mkt., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 324, 326–
27 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). See also Samuels & Samuels, supra note 39, at 764 n.9. 
 82 See MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 3, at § 29:61. 
 83 Max Vern, A Trademark Visa—Aspects of International Trademark Use and 
Protection, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 847, 850 (2006). See also MCCARTHY 
ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 3, at § 29:61. 
 84 Vern, supra note 83, at 850. 
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criminal grounds,85 at least one well-known treatise on trademark 
doctrine86 has cited this case as an application of the Famous Foreign 
Marks Doctrine by a signatory country to the Paris Convention.87 
The key principle underlying the Paris Convention is national 
treatment: prohibiting a country from providing more favorable treatment 
to its own citizens than to foreigners with respect to intellectual property 
protection.88 A member nation must grant foreign trademark holders the 
same rights that it gives to its own citizens.89 Under the standard set forth 
in the Paris Convention, the treatment of a foreign holder’s mark in the 
United States should not differ from the treatment of an American 
holder’s mark. Thus, it would seem that the inquiry as to whether or not 
the Famous Foreign Marks Doctrine applies in the United States should 
end with the plain language of the Paris Convention.90 If the United 
States is bound by the provisions of the Paris Convention, a treaty to 
which it is a party, then an exception for famous marks from the 
territoriality principle seems readily apparent.91 At the time of this 
publication, however, a number of courts in the United States have held 
that the Paris Convention is not self-executing92 and is subordinate to the 
                                                                                                             
 85 Id. See also http://www.komonews.com/news/archive/4169586.html (Komo News, 
Nov. 17, 2005, “Starbucks Wins Trademark Battle in Russia”); INTA Bulletin, March 15, 
2006 (“Starbucks Trademark Victory in Russia”). 
 86 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 3. McCarthy also cites a 2005 case in 
which Walt Disney Enterprises successfully prevented an Iranian from registering in Iran 
the MICKEY MOUSE trademark, in Farsi, along with an image of the cartoon mouse. Id. 
 87 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 3, at § 29:61. 
 88 Robert J. Gutowski, Comment, The Marriage of Intellectual Property and 
International Trade in the TRIPS Agreement: Strange Bedfellows or a Match Made in 
Heaven?, 47 BUFFALO L. REV. 713, 718 (1999).  Article 2(1) of the Paris Convention 
provides: “Nationals of any country of the Union shall, as regards the protection of 
industrial property, enjoy in all the other countries of the Union the advantages that their 
respective laws now grant, or may hereafter grant, to nationals; all without prejudice to 
the rights specially provided for in this Convention.”  Id. (citing Paris Convention, supra 
note 14, art. 2). 
 89 Robert C. Bird, Defending Intellectual Property Rights in the BRIC Economies, 43 
AM. BUS. L.J. 317, 320 (2006). 
 90 See Paris Convention, supra note 14. The Paris Convention prohibits use in one 
member country of “a mark considered by the competent authority of the country of 
registration to be well known [in that country] as being already the mark of a person 
entitled to the benefits of the present Convention. . . .”  Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Section 44(b) of the Lanham Act provides that: “[a]ny person whose country of 
origin is a party to any convention or treaty relating to trademarks . . . to which the 
United States is also a party . . . shall be entitled to the benefits of this section under the 
conditions expressed herein to the extent necessary to give effect to any provision of such 
convention . . . in addition to the rights to which any owner of a mark is otherwise 
entitled by this Act.” 15 U.S.C. § 1126(b) (2006).  While potentially interpreted as an 
“avenue for reliance on international norms[,]”courts and scholars have hesitated to 
construe the words “to the extent necessary to give effect to any provision of such 
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provisions independently provided in the Lanham Act.93 In Medellin v. 
Texas,94 the Supreme Court addressed the domestic effect of an 
international treaty provision95 and denied domestic application of a 
treaty previously assumed to be self-executing.96 The Court stated that: 
“[i]t is up to Congress whether to implement obligations undertaken 
under a treaty which (like this one) does not itself have the force and 
effect of domestic law . . . .”97 The effect of this decision on treaty 
interpretation will be debated for years to come,98 and the question of 
whether the Paris Convention is considered self-executing presently 
remains in considerable doubt following Medellin. 
PART II: CONSUMER SEARCH COSTS 
This section will address how trademark law is intended to protect 
both consumers and producers, or trademark holders.99 The architects of 
the Lanham Act endeavored to secure for the owner the goodwill 
                                                                                                             
convention” to mean that the Paris Convention controls over the Lanham Act. The 
primary reason underlying this hesitation is that the wording of Section 44 is viewed as 
too ambiguous to require the somewhat far-reaching conclusion that unfair competition 
under the Lanham Act should be governed by European laws of unfair competition as 
provided in the Paris Convention. Edward Lee, The New Canon: Using or Misusing 
Foreign Law To Decide Domestic Intellectual Property Claims, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 52 
(2005); ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 162 (2d Cir. 2007); L’Aiglon Apparel, 
Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649, 654 (3d Cir. 1954); but see General Motors Corp. 
v. Ignacio Lopez de Arriortua, 948 F. Supp. 684, 687–88 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (finding that 
Congress intended to incorporate substantive rights of the Paris Convention into the 
Lanham Act). 
 93 Int’l Cafe v. Hard Rock Cafe Int’l, 252 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding 
that “[a]s other courts of appeals have noted, the rights articulated in the Paris 
Convention do not exceed the rights conferred by the Lanham Act. Instead, we conclude 
that the Paris Convention, as incorporated by the Lanham Act, only requires ‘national 
treatment.’”). See also ITC Ltd., 482 F.3d at 162 (holding that “[t]he Paris Convention 
creates no substantive rights beyond those independently provided in the Lanham Act.”). 
 94 Medellin v. Texas, 129 S. Ct. 360 (2008). 
 95 Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes to the 
Vienna Convention, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 325, T.I.A.S. No. 6820. 
 96 Medellin, 129 S. Ct. at 361. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Robert Greffenius, Selling Medellin: The Entourage of Litigation Surrounding the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and the Weight of International Court of 
Justice Opinions in the Domestic Sphere, 23 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 943, 944 (2008). 
 99 Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademarks and The Internet: The United States’ 
Experience, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 931 (2007). See also S. Rep. No. 1333, at 3, reprinted 
in 1946 U.S.C.A.N. 1274, 1277 (1946) (stating that the purpose of the Lanham Act is to 
“protect the public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a 
particular trademark which it favorably knows, it will get the product which it asks for 
and wants to get. Secondly, where the owner of a trademark has spent energy, time, and 
money in presenting to the public the product, he is protected in his investment from its 
misappropriation.”). 
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associated with its trademark, prevent diversion of trade through 
commercial misrepresentations, and protect the public against exposure 
to confusingly similar trademarks.100 While a consumer with expert 
knowledge about the products he seeks to purchase still falls within the 
purview of general trademark theory,101 the principal beneficiary of 
trademark law is the “ignorant, the weak, and the unwary” consumer.102 
This Part addresses how protection of trademarks will protect this 
“unwary” consumer by reducing his cost of searching for an item that 
suits his or her needs, and how the reduction of consumer search costs 
will encourage the free flow of information and thereby contribute to an 
economically efficient market. 
The availability of trademarks reduces the typical consumer’s cost 
of locating an item that she likes based on her prior use of an item with 
the same trademark.103 A trademark assures the consumer that any 
product with a particular trademark originates from the same source as 
any other product bearing the same mark,104 thereby encouraging the 
consumer to repeatedly purchase goods that were previously 
satisfactory.105 Therefore, brands serve as the “shorthand that consumers 
use to guide their all important purchasing decisions.”106 
By way of example, imagine a consumer who enjoys using 
Listerine® mouthwash.107 That consumer will be reassured in the 
knowledge that if he or she goes to the drugstore and purchases a bottle 
of Listerine® mouthwash, that bottle will live up to the quality and safety 
standards as a Listerine® mouthwash used on a prior occasion. The 
consumer knows that all products with the Listerine® trademark come 
                                                                                                             
 100 S. Rep. No. 1333. See also Auvil, supra note 44, at 440. 
 101 Florence Mfg. Co. v. J. C. Dowd & Co., 178 F. 73, 75 (2d Cir. 1910) (“The law is 
not made for the protection of experts, but for the public—that vast multitude which 
includes the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous, who, in making purchases, do not 
stop to analyze, but are governed by appearances and general impressions.”). 
 102 Patricia P. Bailey & Michael Pertschuk, The Law of Deception: the Past as 
Prologue, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 849, 868 n.90 (citing Von Mumm v. Frash, 56 F. 830, 839 
(2d Cir. 1893)). 
 103 See Q Div. Records, LLC v. Q Records, No. 99–10828, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
1773, at *7 n.8 (D. Mass. 2000) (stating that “[c]larity and distinction among trademarks 
serves the further purpose of making it easy for consumers to find the brands they want 
without inefficiently expending extra effort to search for them.”). 
 104 New Kids on the Block v. News America Pub., Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 305 (9th Cir. 
1992). 
 105 Frank I. Schecter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 
813, 818 (1927). 
 106 SCOTT M. DAVIS, BRAND ASSET MANAGEMENT: DRIVING PROFITABLE GROWTH 
THROUGH YOUR BRANDS 141 (Jossey-Bass 2002) (“This shorthand relieves consumers 
from enduring the mentally exhausting and unsure process of trying a new brand.”). 
 107 Listerine® is a registered trademark of Johnson & Johnson Healthcare Products 
Division of McNEIL-PPC, Inc. 
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from the same source.108 Similarly, the producer of Listerine® will enjoy 
the ability to draw this particular consumer to its product by merely 
placing a recognizable name and/or trade symbol on its product 
packaging. The time saved by the consumer to locate a suitable product, 
without having to inefficiently expend extra effort and evaluate the 
product choices in a store, is an example of a reduction in consumer 
search costs.109 
Trademarks contribute to economic efficiency by reducing 
consumer search costs, which is often cited as the principal goal of 
trademark law.110 There are several benefits conferred on both consumers 
and producers by such a cost reduction.111 A trademark permits a 
consumer to “know[] at a glance whose brand he is being asked to buy[,] 
whom to hold responsible if the brand disappoints[,] and whose product 
to buy in the future if the brand pleases.”112 Successful trademarks serve 
as a “shorthand indicator” of the provenance and qualities of a particular 
good113 and provide the consumer with a “packet of information” with 
which to make a consumption decision.114 Accordingly, an increase in 
the supply of information about a good corresponds with a decrease in 
the marginal cost of such information. As the cost of information 
decreases, demand for the information increases. This results in a better-
informed consumer clientele and, ultimately, a more competitive 
market.115 
Producers also reap substantial benefits from the existence of 
trademark protection. Trademark law enables a producer to invest in the 
development of a high quality product and rest securely in the knowledge 
that a producer of a similar, yet lower quality, product cannot free-ride 
on the high quality producer’s goodwill.116 Without a guarantee that a 
                                                                                                             
 108 New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 305 n.2. 
 109 Q Div. Records, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1773, at *7 n.8. 
 110 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic 
Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 266 (1987). 
 111 Carter, supra note 19, at 762; see also Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510 (7th 
Cir. 2002). 
 112 Ty Inc., 306 F.3d at 510. 
 113 Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on 
the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 787 (2004). 
 114 See Carter, supra note 19, at 759. 
 115 Id. 
 116 “High quality producer goodwill” refers to the higher costs incurred by a producer 
to develop a high quality product than those incurred in producing a lower quality 
product. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 113, at 787.  While protection of producer 
goodwill is of significant importance, this protection is not absolute. If protection of a 
trademark would inhibit competition, the interest in preserving a competitive marketplace 
will prevail.  Carter, supra note 19, at 792.  See Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 
U.S. 111, 121–22 (1938) (permitting Kellogg to produce cereal in a “pillow-shape” form 
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competing firm cannot produce a duplicate product at the same marginal 
cost, a production firm is unlikely to expend resources on developing a 
new product or improving the quality of an existing product.117 Because 
trademark law prevents another firm from copying a source-identifying 
mark, a producer who holds a trademark for a product is thus assured that 
it “will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated with a 
desirable product.”118 Trademarks protect a producer from free-riding by 
a lower quality producer because a trademark enables the consumer to 
recognize a brand and associate a level of quality with that particular 
brand.119 If the consumer lacked the ability to distinguish between brands 
of a similar product, e.g. shampoo, producers of luxury shampoo would 
lack incentive to develop a costlier, higher quality product than the 
generic brand of shampoo sold in the drugstore.120 
Professor Robert G. Bone likens this phenomenon to Akerlof’s 
“lemons” model.121 Akerlof’s research focused on asymmetry of 
information.122 A purchaser of a used car who has no way to determine 
whether or not the car is a “lemon” (a car of little or no value) will 
subsequently discount the value of all used cars available in the 
market.123 When the typical used car consumer cannot distinguish high 
quality from junk, this has a negative effect on sellers of high quality 
used cars.124 Returning to the shampoo example above, without reliable 
trademarks, the shampoo aisle would simply carry bottles containing 
varying types and quality of shampoo, but a consumer would have 
absolutely no method by which to distinguish a bottle of luxury Frédéric 
                                                                                                             
and with the descriptive name “Shredded Wheat,” even though this would allow Kellogg 
to share the goodwill of the cereal’s original creator, National Biscuit Co. The Court gave 
Kellogg this right because it found that allowing Kellogg to share in the goodwill of the 
unprotected Shredded Wheat trademark would reduce production costs and maintain high 
quality products, goals in which the overall consuming public is deeply interested). 
 117 Landes & Posner, supra note 110, at 270. Contrary to popular belief, trademark 
law does not seek to encourage development of a brand as a stand-alone entity. See 
Dogan & Lemley, supra note 113, at 801 n.93. Trademark law protects brand 
development only to the extent that use of that branded mark will reduce consumer search 
costs.  Id. 
 118 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995) (quoting 1 
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, § 2:03 (3d ed. 1994)). 
 119 Bone, supra note 31, at 2108. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. 
 122 George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970). 
 123 Id. 
 124 The standard for the typical consumer is the “ignorant, the weak, and the unwary.”  
Bailey & Pertschuk, supra note 102, at 868 n.90 (citing Von Mumm v. Frash, 56 F. 830, 
839 (2d Cir. 1893)). 
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Fekkai shampoo125 from a bottle of generic store brand shampoo. When a 
consumer possesses no ability to distinguish between products, a luxury 
goods producer such as Frédéric Fekkai has no incentive to create a 
brand with higher quality characteristics.126 The result is economic 
inefficiency.127 
Fortunately, trademarks encourage the flow of information in 
markets.128 The goal of trademark law is to “promote rigorous, truthful 
competition in the marketplace.”129 Modern trademark theory posits that 
trademark law is designed to prevent an increase in consumer search 
costs.130 This idea is easily illustrated through a brief review of the 
Federal Trademark Dilution Act (the “FTDA”).131 Courts require four 
main elements to establish a claim of trademark dilution: (1) whether 
plaintiff’s mark is famous and distinctive; (2) whether defendant’s mark 
was used in commerce; (3) whether defendant’s use occurred after 
plaintiff’s mark became famous; and (4) whether defendant’s use caused 
dilution of plaintiff’s mark.132 A senior user of a trademark—a user who 
has achieved priority of use—whose mark has been diluted loses 
incentive to improve its brand image.133 Further, as a consumer’s ability 
to distinguish between products declines, a producer’s desire and 
motivation to improve or develop its brand similarly declines.134 In turn, 
this imposes costs on the consumer because the consumer must now 
exert more effort to locate the product he or she desires.135 Imagine a 
restaurant that uses the “Tiffany” name, which is typically associated 
with Tiffany & Co. jewelers.136 While use of the “Tiffany” name does 
not confuse the public into thinking it is encountering an establishment 
of Tiffany jewelers, it does weaken the “efficacy of the name as an 
identifier of the store . . . . Consumers will have to think harder—incur as 
                                                                                                             
 125 The Frédéric & Company website touts its hair product collection as “the ultimate 
in luxury hair care.”  Frédéric Fekkai, http://www.fredericfekkai.com/about/ (last visited 
December 29, 2008). 
 126 See Bone, supra note 31, at 2108. 
 127 Id. 
 128 David W. Barnes, A New Economics of Trademarks, 5 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. 
PROP. 22, 27 (2006); see also Dogan & Lemley, supra note 113, at 787. 
 129 Barnes, supra note 128, at 27. 
 130 Id. at 49. 
 131 Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: Pub. L. No. 104–98, 109 Stat. 985 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 1125(c), 1127 (2006)). 
 132 Lee Goldman, Proving Dilution, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 569, 571–72 (2004). While 
there is consensus regarding the elements themselves, there is significant disagreement 
among courts as to the interpretation and application of these elements.  Id. 
 133 Id. at 575. 
 134 See Bone, supra note 31, at 2108. 
 135 See Goldman, supra note 132, at 575. 
 136 Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 2002). 
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it were a higher imagination cost—to recognize the name as the name of 
the store.”137 Trademarks alleviate the need for consumers to “think 
harder” in order to determine whether the good or service is one they 
want to purchase. The availability of a trademark on a product 
immediately provides the consumer with information about the good’s 
origin and quality, which reduces the consumer’s cost of searching for 
suitable goods. Reducing the consumer’s search costs also reduces the 
producer’s cost of marketing and locating a suitable consumer for its 
products. By lowering costs for both consumers and producers, the 
overall goals of trademark law to promote an efficient market and reduce 
consumer search costs can be achieved. 
PART III: CIRCUIT SPLIT 
The question of whether a famous foreign mark, registered abroad 
but not registered in the United States, should receive trademark 
protection under the Lanham Act138 remains uncertain following a circuit 
split between the Second and Ninth Circuits.139 The Second Circuit has 
explicitly declined to extend protection to a foreign mark that is famous 
but not registered in the United States.140 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit 
has developed a two-part test that would provide protection, in limited 
circumstances, to a famous unregistered mark in the United States.141 
Ninth Circuit: Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co. 
Grupo Gigante is of particular importance because it represents the 
first application of a famous marks exception to the territoriality 
principle by a circuit court.142 Unlike the Second Circuit, the Ninth 
Circuit did not base its decision in Grupo Gigante on strict statutory 
interpretation; instead, the court identified compelling policy reasons to 
carve out an exception to the territoriality principle.143 In Grupo Gigante, 
                                                                                                             
 137 Id. 
 138 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006) (creating a civil cause of action for 
likelihood of confusion); see id. § 1125(c) (allowing a cause of action for injunctive relief 
to the owner of a famous mark). 
 139 Compare ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2007), with Grupo 
Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 140 ITC Ltd., 482 F.3d at 135. 
 141 Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1098. 
 142 Jeffrey M. Samuels and Linda B. Samuels, Recent Developments in U.S. 
Trademark Law: A Confusing State of Affairs, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 361, 
371 (April 2006); See also Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1094 (noting that “[t]here is no 
circuit-court authority—from this or any other circuit—applying a famous-mark 
exception to the territoriality principle.”). 
 143 Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1094 (finding that “[a]n absolute territoriality rule 
without a famous-mark exception would promote consumer confusion and fraud . . . . 
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a Mexican company operated a chain of “Gigante” supermarkets on the 
United States-Mexico border.144 Nearly forty years after the creation of 
the Mexican Gigante chain, the defendant opened a grocery store in the 
San Diego area called “Gigante Market.”145 When Grupo Gigante sought 
to expand its operations into the United States, a battle ensued between 
Grupo Gigante and defendant Dallo regarding which party had 
established priority of use.146 
The Ninth Circuit held that the territoriality principle, which grants 
“priority of trademark rights in the United States . . . solely upon priority 
of use in the United States, not on priority of use anywhere in the world,” 
should not be absolute.147 The court created a two-part test to determine 
whether a mark is sufficiently famous to receive protection.148 First, the 
mark must satisfy the secondary meaning requirement.149 To obtain 
trademark registration under the Lanham Act, unless a mark is 
“fanciful,” “arbitrary,” or “suggestive,” the user must present proof that 
the mark has acquired secondary meaning.150 Broadly speaking, a mark 
has acquired secondary meaning when, “in the minds of the public, [its] 
primary significance . . . is to identify the source of the product rather 
than the product itself.”151 For example, initially, the term “Teddy 
Graham” brings to mind a physical description of the product itself—a 
graham cracker biscuit in the shape of a teddy bear.152 Only when the 
term “Teddy Graham” can evoke in the collective mind of the public a 
specific good “produced or sponsored by a particular person”153—in the 
case of the Teddy Graham, a product by Kraft Foods Inc.154—has the 
                                                                                                             
There can be no justification for using trademark law to fool immigrants into thinking 
that they are buying from the store they liked back home.”). 
 144 Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1091. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. at 1092–93. 
 147 Id. at 1093 (quoting MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 3, at § 29:2) 
(emphasis added), contra Buti v. Impressa Perosa, S.R.L., 139 F.3d 98, 103–05 (2d Cir. 
1998) (adopting a strict application of the territoriality principle and refusing to consider 
earlier use in another country as a factor to determine priority of use). 
 148 Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1096. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Deven R. Desai & Sandra L. Rierson, Confronting the Genericism Conundrum, 28 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1789, 1806 (2007).  See also Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting 
World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 11 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 151 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 211 (2000) (citing Inwood 
Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851, n.11 (1982)). 
 152 Desai & Rierson, supra note 150, at 1808. 
 153 Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13(a), (b) (1995)). 
 154 See Kraft Foods Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 4 (Feb. 26, 2008). 
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term achieved the secondary meaning necessary to qualify for trademark 
registration in the United States.155 
The Ninth Circuit enumerated certain non-dispositive factors that 
may establish secondary meaning, including: direct consumer testimony; 
survey evidence; exclusivity, manner, and length of use of a mark; 
amount and manner of advertising; amount of sales and number of 
customers; established place in the market; and proof of intentional 
copying by the defendant.156 The mark must be distinctive enough to 
warrant protection, and the plaintiff’s geographical use of the mark must 
be widespread enough such that the mark has gained secondary meaning 
not only within the area in which it has been used, but also within a 
“remote” area where a subsequent user claims a right to use the mark.157 
The second step of the Ninth Circuit test to receive protection under the 
Famous Foreign Marks Doctrine requires a plaintiff to show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that, when the mark has not previously 
been used in the U.S. market, a “substantial percentage of consumers in 
the relevant American market is familiar with the foreign mark.”158 
Grupo Gigante did not explicitly identify consumer search cost 
theory as the rationale for permitting a limited application of the Famous 
Foreign Marks Doctrine, but the benefits of the holding with respect to 
search costs can be gleaned from a brief examination of the policy points 
explicitly stated in the opinion. According to the Ninth Circuit, 
“[t]rademark is, at its core, about protecting against consumer 
confusion.”159 The court used the example of a high-end salon in 
Australia with a red door called “Elizabeth Arden’s,” with no affiliation 
to the chain of Red Door Spas operated in the United States and Europe 
by Elizabeth Arden Spas, LLC.160 Consumers in Australia seeking spa 
treatment would likely visit “Elizabeth Arden’s,” thinking that it was an 
affiliate of Red Door Spas, only to discover later that the quality of 
                                                                                                             
 155 Id. 
 156 Filipino Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Asian Journal Publ’ns, Inc., 198 F.3d 1143, 1151 
(9th Cir. 1999). See also 2 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 3, at § 15:30. 
 157 Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1097 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 158 Id. at 1098 (emphasis added). The court suggested that (i) intentional copying by 
the defendant and (ii) the likelihood that customers of the American company will think 
they are patronizing the firm that uses the mark in a different country would be relevant 
factors in determining the sufficiency of the familiarity of American consumers with the 
foreign mark. Id. 
 159 Id. at 1094. See also Thane Int’l v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir. 
2002) (finding that “[t]he question whether an alleged trademark infringer’s use of a 
mark creates a likelihood that the consuming public will ‘be confused as to who makes 
what’ product is therefore the ‘core element’ of trademark infringement law.”). 
 160 Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1094–95; Red Door Spas – About Us, 
http://www.reddoorspas.com/aboutus.aspx (last visited December 29, 2008). 
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treatment differed substantially from that of the American/European Red 
Door Spas.161 
The court focused on the detrimental effect such consumer 
confusion would have on the producer, Elizabeth Arden,162 but the harm 
caused would be no less severe for the consumer. Once the consumer is 
unable to rely on the “Elizabeth Arden” mark to deliver the level of 
quality which she associates with salons bearing that name, her costs of 
finding a suitable salon in the future will increase. Should this effect 
continue, the increase in costs to consumers could ultimately undermine 
consumers’ faith and reliance on the current system in which trademarks 
serve as a “shorthand indicator” of a particular good or service’s 
provenance and quality.163 The result would be a market in which 
trademarks carried little or no meaning, and would resemble a market in 
which trademarks did not exist at all. 
Second Circuit: ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc. 
The Second Circuit expressed its adherence to the territoriality 
principle in its recent decision in ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc.164 In ITC 
Ltd., the plaintiff owned the internationally renowned “Bukhara” 
restaurant chain based in New Delhi, India.165 The plaintiff brought a 
claim for trademark infringement against the defendants, previous 
employees of the New Delhi Bukhara, who had opened a restaurant in 
Manhattan named “Bukhara Grill.”166 The plaintiff alleged that 
defendants utilized logos, décor, staff uniforms and menus in the 
Manhattan Bukhara Grill that were strikingly similar to those already in 
use in the famous New Delhi Bukhara restaurant chain.167 The court 
found that the plaintiff did not have priority rights to the mark under 
Section 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act, holding instead that “absent 
some use of its mark in the United States, a foreign mark holder 
generally may not assert priority rights under federal law, even if a U.S. 
competitor has knowingly appropriated that mark for his own use.”168 
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 168 Id. at 155–56. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006). The Court of Appeals of 
New York, in its review of a question certified to it by the Second Circuit in ITC Ltd., 
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The Second Circuit concluded that Congress has not yet adopted 
the idea that continued international use of a mark leads to a federally 
protected right under the Lanham Act, and found persuasive the fact that 
no provision of the Lanham Act or other federal law recognizes a famous 
marks exception to the territoriality principle.169 Further, the court found 
that the absence of statutory discourse addressing the issue was not 
merely an unintentional omission by Congress.170 Instead, the court 
reasoned that the Lanham Act’s specificity in detailing circumstances 
under which the holder of a foreign registered mark can claim priority 
rights, and the absence of a discussion of a famous marks exception in 
specific detail, suggested an intention on the part of Congress to exclude 
a famous marks exception from the scope of the Lanham Act.171 
As a result of the absence of statutory authority governing a famous 
marks exception, the Second Circuit stated that “[b]efore we construe the 
Lanham Act to include such a significant departure from the principle of 
territoriality, we will wait for Congress to express its intent more 
clearly.”172 This holding rejected the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Grupo 
Gigante,173 as well as numerous decisions of the Trademark Trial and 
Appeal Board.174 The Second Circuit voiced its concern that none of 
these aforementioned decisions referenced the Lanham Act, the Paris 
Convention, or any other federal law in support of their findings of a 
famous foreign marks exception.175 
In sum, the Second Circuit has declined to recognize the Famous 
Foreign Marks Doctrine and has adopted a strict statutory approach to 
the issue of famous foreign marks. On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit 
has approached the issue from a public policy standpoint, and has 
provided protection to famous, unregistered marks in certain 
circumstances. This lack of clarity among the circuits with regard to U.S. 
law on famous foreign trademarks is confusing for consumers. 
                                                                                                             
 169 ITC Ltd., 482 F.3d at 142, 159 (citing the absence of reliance on the Lanham Act 
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 173 Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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Establishing a uniform approach to the issue is necessary in order to 
maintain the United States’s position as an attractive market for foreign 
producers to enter. 
PART IV: ADOPTING THE FAMOUS FOREIGN MARKS DOCTRINE 
The principle of territoriality has become outdated in the modern 
world where technology is pervasive and consumers freely travel 
between domestic and foreign markets with ever-increasing frequency. 
Adopting the Famous Foreign Marks Doctrine would permit consumers 
and producers alike to benefit from reduced search costs. Failure to 
recognize famous marks that are deeply ingrained and widespread in 
American society would be detrimental to commerce, and Congress must 
take action to ensure Americans benefit from the protection of these 
famous marks. 
The territoriality principle initially gained prevalence because 
theorists felt that the alternative—the universality principle—was based 
on “an idealistic view of the world as a single marketplace.”176 While 
global commerce still does not operate as a single cohesive entity, the 
reputation of a product or service now travels at rapid speeds.177 Often, a 
product can reach a foreign market long before the trademark owner has 
had the opportunity to market the product and “actually use” its 
trademark in the foreign market.178 As a result of the increased speed at 
which trade flows, at least one federal court has noted that “[r]ecognition 
of the famous marks doctrine is particularly desirable in a world where 
international travel is commonplace and where the Internet and other 
media facilitate the rapid creation of business goodwill that transcends 
borders.”179 The increase in international foot traffic, combined with the 
advent of the Internet as a legitimate marketplace, demonstrates that the 
issue of famous foreign marks can no longer be ignored.180 Put simply, it 
is no longer fair to say that a mark used abroad is not sufficiently well-
known to U.S. consumers. The current state of the law—that use in the 
United States of a mark used and well-known abroad does not give rise 
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to a claim for trademark infringement — is unjustified and a hindrance to 
global trade. 
In addition to being anachronistic, failure to recognize famous 
foreign marks significantly increases costs for consumers. In selecting a 
good for purchase, consumers effectively pay two costs: (1) the price of 
the good charged by the vendor and (2) the cost of gathering information 
about the product.181 Protecting famous foreign marks will reduce 
consumer search costs because protection will eliminate consumers’ 
apprehension that trademarks consistent within the United States may not 
be consistent worldwide. Imagine a businessman who, during the course 
of a business trip to Italy, discovers a brand of shaving cream he truly 
enjoys. Without the existence of protection for famous marks via the 
Famous Foreign Marks Doctrine, the businessman must question 
whether the product he encounters in his corner drugstore in Chicago 
originates from the same source as a product with an identical mark he 
enjoyed in Italy.182 His costs of locating a good that he knows will satisfy 
his needs increase when he cannot rely upon the mark with which he 
became familiar in Italy. 
This predicament will not only increase the businessman’s costs, 
but it will open the door for a producer marketing goods in the United 
States to free-ride on the goodwill of the Italian producer’s trademark.183 
Threatened by the prospect of free-riding producers in America, the 
Italian producer has two courses of action. The Italian producer might 
cease product development, seeing no direct benefit from developing a 
higher quality product that will receive no recognition in the U.S. market. 
Alternatively, it will launch an attempt to gain registration and priority in 
the United States, the cost of which will likely translate into higher prices 
for consumers.184 In either scenario, the consumer and the producer are 
inefficiently expending extra effort to connect the needs of the former 
with the supply of the latter. This produces a result contrary to the 
intended purpose of trademarks—to reduce the search costs of the 
consumer and promote a more competitive, efficient market.185 
Recognizing the Famous Foreign Marks Doctrine will ultimately 
reduce consumer search costs. In terms of effect on the consumer, the 
benefits from protecting famous foreign marks in the United States equal 
                                                                                                             
 181 Michael Grynberg, The Road Not Taken: Initial Interest Confusion, Search Costs, 
and the Challenge of the Internet, 28 SEATTLE L. REV. 97, 109 (2004). 
 182 See, e.g., Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1094.  
 183 See Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 121 (1938). 
 184 Landes & Posner, supra note 110, at 266–70. 
 185 See Q Div. Records, LLC v. Q Records, No. 99–10828, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
1773, at *7 n.8 (D. Mass. 2000); Carter, supra note 19, at 759. 
2008] SEARCH COSTS AND FAMOUS FOREIGN MARKS 237 
the benefits provided by protection of registered trademarks. If a famous 
marks exception is explicitly adopted by Congress, a consumer faced 
with a recognizable mark abroad could confidently rely on prior 
experience with goods bearing that mark, in lieu of conducting a 
thorough examination of the quality of the marked goods. The consumer 
would be able to say to himself: “I need not investigate the attributes of 
the brand I am about to purchase because the trademark is a shorthand 
way of telling me that the attributes are the same as that of the brand I 
enjoyed earlier [in a foreign country].”186 This level of security in making 
consumption decisions will reduce the consumer’s overall costs of 
searching for a suitable good to meet his needs. Because the consumer 
will be armed with a more complete arsenal of information about the 
product he is poised to purchase, communicated to him via the mark 
affixed to the product, his marginal cost of acquiring information about 
the product will correspondingly decrease.187 This, in turn, will result in a 
more competitive market in which the risk of consumer confusion has 
been substantially minimized.188 
CONCLUSION 
The principal goal of trademark law is to reduce consumer search 
costs.189 In this modern age of globalization, isolationism of trademark 
recognition no longer serves American consumers.190 The preservation of 
our global trading system through prevention of unfair exploitation of 
famous marks has become essential.191 If a consumer is satisfied with his 
use of a trademarked product in a foreign country, why should he not 
expect that a similarly trademarked product found in the United States 
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carries the same qualities and characteristics as the product found earlier 
in the foreign country? It cannot be said with much sincerity that a 
consumer exposed to a trademark abroad will never enter the U.S. 
marketplace. Over one million people enter the United States as legal 
permanent residents each year,192 and tens of millions arrive as 
nonimmigrant admissions.193 Further, millions of U.S. citizens and 
permanent residents travel to and from the country on a regular basis. 
Thus, the search costs of the consumer who shops both abroad and in the 
United States are significantly increased by the absence of a statutory 
Famous Foreign Marks Doctrine. The worldly U.S. consumer can no 
longer rely on the consistent quality of international trademarks. 
The future of the Famous Foreign Marks Doctrine lies in the hands 
of Congress. Incorporation of this doctrine into the Lanham Act would 
ensure that the reduction of consumer search costs remains the primary 
objective of trademark law. This goal should not obstructed by an 
unwillingness to part with an outdated conception of the global economy. 
Congress should eliminate the burden of high search costs imposed on 
consumers resulting from lack of protection for famous marks and 
consider an amendment to the Lanham Act that would sufficiently 
protect famous foreign marks. 
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